During the past century of oriental studies, the question of when and where Muslim traditions came to be propped up with validating lines of transmission has attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention, for its bearing on the key issue of the historicity of ḥadīth. In this essay, I review the existing theories about the origin of the isnād, which alternate between the lifetime of the Prophet’s Companions and the end of the second century AH/c. 816 CE. Based on a (...) hitherto largely overlooked tradition and two general methodological premises, I associate the inception of corroborative attribution to past authorities in legal and theological ḥadīth with the aftermath of al-Mukhtār b. Abī ʿUbayd al-Thaqafī’s revolt in Kūfa. Over the course of the second/eighth century, the isnād institution spread out across the major centers of learning in the caliphate and entered the field of historical reports. Such geographical and typological unevenness of the isnād’s evolution gave rise to conflicting theories about its chronology. (shrink)

Cílem této práce je připomenout odkaz J. B. Kozáka (1888–1974) a hodnotu jeho přednášek na Karlově univerzitě v letech 1949–1952, které měly hluboký význam v souvislosti s novou politickou situací po komunistickém puči v roce 1948. Život J. B. Kozáka byl hluboce ovlivněn jeho církevním vzděláním. Nakonec však získal post profesora filosofie na Karlově univerzitě v Praze. Jako prominentní zástupce Českého kulturního života se stal aktivním členem malého kroužku „pátečníků“ založeného spisovatelem K. Čapkem (1890–1938) a podporovaného T. G. Masarykem (1850–1937). (...) J. B. Kozák obhajoval demokratické ideje, ale jeho sympatie zároveň patřily také sociálně orientovaným levicovým osobnostem (viz například jeho přátelství s profesorem Z. Nejedlým, 1878–1962). Před válkou J. B. Kozák opustil Prahu a začal přednášet filosofii na Oberlin College v Chicagu (USA). Na konci války se však do Prahy vrátil. V létě roku 1945 získal znovu univerzitní post s možností přednášet. Ve vášnivých debatách s marxisty hájil myšlenky humanismu a svobody. Získal si sympatie svých studentů a stal se jejich morální autoritou, kterou zůstal i v těžkých časech politických čistek, kdy byli mnozí jeho kolegové propuštěni. Skutečnost, že si udržel pozici na univerzitě, nijak jeho autoritu nepoškodila. Byl chráněn kvůli svým levicovým názorům před válkou. Navzdory respektu, kterého se mu dostávalo, byla jeho možnost přednášet značně omezena. Připojeny jsou také úryvky jeho „dějin filosofie“ jako volné záznamy jeho přednášek. (shrink)

In his article "world and essence" ("phil. Rev." 1970, Pages 461-492) plantinga submitted that (a) individuals have essences and (b) the essence of an individual is a non-Trivial property which can be completely known only to god. In my note it is shown that on plantinga's own definitions each individual x has exactly one essence, The trivial property of x-Identity. Thus (b) fails.

ʿAbd al-Bāqī b. Qāniʿ was a traditionist and evaluator of transmitters, one of the founders of the genre of biographical dictionaries devoted to the Com- panions of the Prophet. Ibn Qāniʿ has not attracted much attention from scholars— only Khalīl Qūtlāy has authored a doctoral dissertation, now published in fifteen volumes, that comprises Ibn Qāniʿ’s Muʿjam al-ṣaḥāba. In this essay I argue that Ibn Qāniʿ and his contemporaries relied on the chains of hadith transmission to extract the names of many (...) Companions. My research also shows that in the eighth/ fourteenth century at least two presently lost biographical collections associated with Ibn Qāniʿ were in circulation: Kitāb al-Wafayāt, a catalogue of death dates of hadith transmitters, and Kitāb al-Tārīkh, an annalistic collection, which included many assessments of transmitter reliability. Ibn Qāniʿ’s unsophisticated methods of hadith criticism, although in line with third/ninth- and early fourth/tenth-century scholarly developments, incurred him some criticism from later hadith scholars. (shrink)

In the paper, Priorś well-known \'tonk\' argument is examined and taken as a basis for general considerations regarding the logical status of implicit definition, and the semantical status of the \'tonk\'-like expressions. Further, the whiff of logical vanity attendant upon Priorś conclusions is dispelled by employing a new theory of concept. In particular, the authors argue that: a) Priorś \'tonk\' argument discredits neither the concept of analytical validity nor the role of implicit definition. The arguments underlying the authors\' view draw (...) from both syntactical and semantical considerations of the alleged \'tonk\' connective. b) Decisive criticism of the very concept of implicit definition of logical connectives can be, anstead, based on Tichýś view of formal axiomatics as a case of\'the Fallacy of Subject Matter\'. c) The semantical analysis of the so-called śtrictly empty\' concepts, as introduced by Materna in his theory of concept, renders a viable account of the mysteries and confusions surrounding Priorś witty and inspiring \'tonk\' example. (shrink)

Quine claims that a) considering meaning as a separate object leads to mentalism and b) to overcome mentalism we have to accept an empirical analysis. The paper shows that a) is wrong and not accepting mentalism we can apply a logical, i.e., not empirical approach.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELLS ARGUMENT AGAINST FREGE'S SENSE-REFERENCE DISTINCTION PAWEL TURNAu Philosophy I Jagiellonian University Cracow, Poland I n "On Denoting"l Russell argued that Frege's theory of sense and reference was an "inextricable tangle", but, ironically, many readers found the argument even more knotry. In an effort to make sense of it, commentators were often driven to attribute to Russell quite obvious and simple fallacies. A different approach was taken by Peter (...) Geach, who suggested that Russell's argument could be given a consistent reading if it were construed as arguing, not against Frege's theory, but against Russell's own earlier theory, which he put forward in The Principles of Mathematics. It is not an implausible hypothesis, considering how prone Russell was to misrepresent' other philosophers' views and read his own powerful ideas into their writings. In order to justifY Geach's hypothesis properly, one would have to show the crucial difference between Russell's and Frege's theories that made only one of them susceptible to the attack in "On Denoting ". Russell explicitly considered the two theories to be "very nearly the same"; this self-interpretation would have to be questioned. Geach's hypothesis would be further strengthened by providing an actual exegesis of the "On Denoting" argument as directed against The Principles ofMathematics theory. In this paper 1 will try to accomplish both of these tasks. Russell is often accused of confusing use and mention. The accusation is not fair, however. It is true that he does not insist on this distinction; he does not employ it extensively. But he is certainly Russell's Argument against Frege's Distinction 53 aware of it; he simply does not think that it is an important logical distinction. Today this view may seem almost incomprehensible, but that only shows the strength of Frege's influence on our ideas. There are two striking symptoms of Russell's lack of concern for the use-mention distinction: firstly, he does not observe the convention which says that putting an expression in quotation marks produces a name of that expression; secondly, he does not feel any need to employ the pair of terms "sentence" and "proposition", but contents himself with the latter only. The claim about Russell's use of inverted commas needs to be proved; I will come to that later. Russell's assertions are often ambiguous between use and mention of expressions. For example, he asserts that "propositions do not contain words" (PaM, p. 47). However, a few pages later, he speaks of propositions that contain the phrase "any number" (p. 53). If this is not to be self-contradictory, then either the term "proposition" must sometimes signifY a linguistic expression, or the term "phrase" must sometimes be understood without implying that a phrase consists of words. This ambiguity is openly admitted in a later article, where he writes: [we shall be concerned with] the distinction between verbs and substantives, or, more correctly, between the objects denoted by verbs and the objects denoted by substantives. Since this more correct expression is long and cumbrous, I shall generally use the shorter expression to mean the same thing. Thus, when I speak of verbs, I mean the object denoted by verbs, and similarly for substantives.2. Russell's attitude towards the distinction between use and mention is not unjustified. It has its reason in his view oflanguage and the subject -matter of logic. In Russell's view, the subject-matter of logic has nothing to do with language. Words, both spoken and written, are entirely outside its realm. Logic, just as other sciences (except linguistics ), is concerned with the entities indicated by words, and not with words themselves. Even the relation of indicating, which holds between words and things in the world, is of no interest to it: "mean1 In Lf(, pp. 39-56. russ.lI: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McMaster Univecsity Library Press n.s. 11 (summer 1991): 51- 66 ISSN 0036-o16~ 2 B. Russell, "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 12 (r9II-12): 1-24; in Lf(, pp. 103-24 (at 107-8). 54 PAWEL TURNAU Russell's Argument... (shrink)

There are two kinds of logical errors. Either you use a non-valid scheme of an argument or your analysis of the premises is mistaken. No extensional or intensional theory can solve the following problem connected with analyzing NL expressions: The Leibniz principle of substituting identical for identical contains the condition a = b. Extensional as well as intensional systems (at least if intensions are defined as functions from possible worlds) analyzing this condition as formulated in natural language are happy if (...) a is contingently or logically or analytically equivalent with b, while this may be insufficient for applying Leibniz. Examples are adduced that show the absurdity of applying Leibniz in such cases. A following remedy is thinkable: one could try to formulate some axioms or perhaps meta-formulated rules that would eliminate the critical cases. This would mean however that a new theory came into being just to shield us from incorrectly applying Leibniz rule. Instead a procedural analysis of NL expressions is offered that makes it possible to unambiguously determine their sense and so their denotation in such a way that the above mentioned critical cases cannot set in. It is shown that the hyperintensional system defined by Transparent intensional logic is able to generally solve the main problems connected with using NL expressions. (shrink)

Introduction. The article is focused on analyzing the aesthetic aspect of A. Kojève’s philosophy, the ability of his philosophy, from an aesthetic point of view, to clarify a number of key problems of the modern political and cultural environment. The purpose of the study is to determine the epistemological attitude of A. Kojève’s philosophy able to clarify the way in which his philosophy problematizes the current cultural and political reality. Methods. Hermeneutics, comparative analysis and deconstruction are used as research methods. (...) Comparative analysis allows us to demarcate A. Kojève’s own line of reasoning, in the context of aesthetic and epistemological theories, as well as Hegelian themes themselves. Hermeneutics is the central method in the work, since the philosophy of A. Kojeve requires interpretation as an aesthetic theory. Deconstruction, formalized to the status of a method according to P. de Man, allows us to detect inconsistencies, the principle of mutual problematization of Kojeve’s philosophy and the current political and epistemological agenda. Scientific novelty of the research. The standard way of interpreting the work of A. Kojève is to evaluate him as an interpreter of G. Hegel. The author analyzes some meaning of A. Kojève’s philosophy, separate from G. Hegel’s explanation of the text. The novelty lies not only in the fact that A. Kojève’s philosophy is defined as theorizing that goes beyond technical hermeneutics (clear presentation), but also as a specific representation of such theorizing as epistemological aesthetic theory. The latter is a rather rare interpretation of the philosophy of A. Kojeve. This allows us to expand the traditional assumption that post-Hegelian epistemesthetics is the property of an extremely limited number of authors (for example, B. Croce). Moreover, such an interpretation of A. Kojève’s theories is a new element in the emerging trend of considering political issues within the framework of epistemological aesthetics. Results. The specific mode of interpreting G. Hegel, which is carried out by A. Kojève, turns the philosophy of the former into a unique aesthetic project. In this project, the category of aesthetic experience comes to the foreground, indicating the empty, formal nature of any discourse. In this regard, any claim to knowledge of reality, to a correct idea of the subject is replaced by the idea of creating the subject of discourse. Consistent treatment of this idea is symptomatic of the philosophy of A. Kojève. This philosophy is a reflection of those historical changes that gave rise to the culture of “aesthetic rationality”: empty and formal. In A. Kojève’s philosophy, one can see how such a culture of the End of History is, contrary to Hegelian ideas, not the era of the struggle decline, but the era of its strange transformation, a symptom of increasing political violence. Conclusions. A. Kojève’s philosophy is considered not as a utopian political project, but as a problematization of the modern cultural and political sphere. The latter is understood as an indication of the inconsistency of ontological discourses of Truth, the discovery in the very essence of discursive practices of an empty, formal principle, and therefore primarily of interest to aesthetics. The modern era of the End of History and the end of the era of persuasive speech gives an idea of the main political paradox (at least for the philosophy of A. Kojève, and at most for the modern political environment). The era of disappointment in discourse should become an era of refusal to fight for discourses, but it becomes an era of maximizing violence, since it is in a situation of disappointment that discourses can only be supported by force. We move from unconvincing speech to convincing violence, but it is possible to understand the origins and specifics of this transition only by considering A. Kojève’s philosophy in the light of such a discipline as aesthetics. (shrink)

T i 2 = S i +1 2 implies ∑ p i +1 ⊆ Δ p i +1 ⧸poly. S 2 and IΔ 0 ƒ are not finitely axiomatizable. The main tool is a Herbrand-type witnessing theorem for ∃∀∃ П b i -formulas provable in T i 2 where the witnessing functions are □ p i +1.

Five Heads (1929–1930) and Actors in the Square (1969). An attempt was made to trace the external plan of the image in all its elements (form construction, figure composition, the characteristics of faces, the color landscape) and to reveal the internal plan, the figurative structure, which manifests itself in the play of the color surface, which performs a dual role: to be both an object shell and a screen, where associations that arose in the mind and imagination of the artist (...) in the process of work are visualized. The attempt to see and analyze how the interweaving of the two image planes (symbiosis, synthesis), their flowing into each other create a pulsating image of the work that touches the feelings of the viewer. (shrink)

The paper deals with the analysis of the buffer or transitional nature of humanistic-oriented school subjects like “Philosophy for children” first introduced in the USA by Dr. M. Lipman and Dr. Ann Sharp. A new ecopsychological and ecofacilitative vision is suggested. The ecofacilitative approach is assumed to be better fit a) into the framework of the ongoing educational ecocrisis and b) as a resolution of the emergent eurointegration and globalization issues.

In [Laurence, Margolis 2003] the authors try - within their polemics against F.Jackson’s views in [Jackson 1998] - to decide the question whether concepts are a priori (in their formulation “to be defined a priori”). Their discussion suffers - as a number of similar articles - from a typical drawback: some problem whose solution requires an exact notion of concept is handled as if the latter were quite clear. The consequence of this ‘conceptual laxity’ is that a) the topic of (...) the discussion is not very clear (what does the phrase ‘concepts must be defined a priori’ mean?); b) the relevance of the Quinean criticism of the “second dogma of empiricism”, i.e., of Quine’s claim that “science sometimes overturns our most cherished beliefs” and therefore there is no sharp boundary between analytic and synthetic is uncritically accepted; c) no distinction is made between the question whether the relation between an expression and its meaning is a priori and the question whether the relation between a concept and the object identified by the concept is a priori. The present article intends to elucidate and then to answer the questions that can be asked when we say something like “concepts are a priori ”. (shrink)

The author discusses B.G. Yudin's image technoscience as having two contours, the external one dealing with science, business and society, and the internal one represented by laboratories. Together these two contours present a multidimensional net of relations between science and technology in conducting experiments, development of instruments (e.g. visualization tools), etc. The author argues that, in such a system, coordinated activity of the internal and the external contours is provided by a synergy of regulatory principles of truth, good and usefulness. (...) He discusses a case of synthetic biology which, as he argues, demonstrates that the internal and external contours of technoscience undergo a process of technologization. Technologization is understood as a transition from research techniques to systematic use of technologies. Biotechnologies are claimed to have a double socio-biological helix network structure. Each network is formed as a kind of ad hoc "factory" and is aimed at solving specific research problems. (shrink)

The article discusses the challenges, benefits, and risks that, from a bioethical perspective, arise because of the the development of eHealth projects. The conceptual framework of the research is based on H. Jonas’ principles of the ethics of responsibility and B.G. Yudin’s anthropological ideas on human beings as agents who constantly change their own boundaries in the “zone of phase transitions.” The article focuses on the events taking place in the zone of phase transitions between humans and machines in eHealth. (...) It is shown that for innovative practices related to digitalization and datafication in medicine, it is needed to rethink central bioethical concepts of personal autonomy and informed consent. In particular, the concept of broad or open informed consent is discussed, which allows the idea of moral responsibility in the field of biomedical technologies to be extended to events of uncertain future. The authors draw attention to the problems associated with the emergence of new autonomous subjects/agents in relationship between doctors and patients. The humanization of machines occurring in eHealth is accompanied by a counter trend – the formation of conceptions and practices of the quantified self. There emerges the practices of self-care and bio-power caused by the datafication and digitization of personality. The authors conclude that bioethics should proactively develop norms for the evolving interaction between doctor and patients. (shrink)

We consider the problem whether the $\forall \Sigma _{1}^{b}$ theorems of the fragments $T_{2}^{a}$ form a strictly increasing hierarchy. We shall show a link to some results about the lengths of proofs in predicate logic that supports the conjecture that the hierarchy is strictly increasing.

The paper is devoted to the analysis of theurgic aesthetics in relation to the concept of utopia that initiates a different understanding of the philosophy of the Russian diaspora representatives through the prism of utopian theurgy of beauty and art. Introducing the idea of utopian theurgy of beauty and art the authors emphasize its meaningful, axiological component. The authors interpret the utopian theurgy of beauty and art in the Russian diaspora philosophy of the first third of the 20th century as (...) an aesthetically mystical experience of the imperfection of human earthly existence that causes a gap with socio-historical reality with direct co-existence of the creative individual with God who is considered to be the true Beauty, the cosmic Harmony, and the universal Love. The meaning of the utopian theurgy of beauty and art is in achieving the goal of possible union with the deity, as well as in affirming persons actions as a co-creator of the world process. The utopian theurgy of beauty and art of an optimistic nature, associated with the light of hope directed to the transformation of earthly existence is reflected in N.S. Arsenyev's idea of spiritual joy achievable in the mystical experience of "longing for Beauty in God"; in B.P. Vysheslavtsev's reflections about the artistic and creative embodiment of eros as thirst, the birth of the God-Man in beauty, as well as in I.A. Ilyin's philosophy, in which, despite disappointments in social changes, the faith in art as the Mystery, as "a service and a joy" always following sacred traditions is preserved. The aesthetic and pessimistic foundations of utopian theurgy are realized in the aesthetic views of V.V. Weidle, according to which art has lost its orientation to high objective spirituality; in S.L. Frank's idea of unrealized Beauty as a dream of the ultimate transformation of the world that is opposed by the bitter reality of the split of being; as well as in the philosophy of N.A. Berdyaev, who postulates the tragedy of earthly existence caused by the unattainability of the full realization of the cosmic Beauty that considers as the goal of the world process. N.O. Lossky's metaphysics, intuitionism and value system are of particular importance, as the utopian theurgy of beauty and art consists in the following: there always remains a share of the absolute truth in art that is the world of illusions and artists imagination; the absolute value of beauty universally valid for all substantial personalities is affirmed. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructionism and Deconstructionism” by Pavel Boytchev. Upshot: Pavel Boytchev’s article calls attention to the fruitful dialectic between building things and taking them apart: No successful construction without deconstruction. Of course by using the word “deconstruction,” he is also implicitly invoking the critical-theory sense of the term, inviting us to deconstruct constructionism. I found the article fascinating on both levels.

The Transparent Intensional Logic explicates the meaning of a linguistic expression as a construction. The construction is a hyperintensional entity. It is characterised as instructions for a „calculation“ of a concrete value. In the terminology of Pavel Tichy a linguistic expression denotes its meaning , which construes the signification of the expression. If the signification is an intension, we can call it a reference of the expression. In several semantic conceptions the question of the denotation and of the reference (...) are not treated equally. The terminological chaos can be resolved in a specific way thanks to „fine-grained“ character of the logical analysis offered by TIL. (shrink)

In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P, because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is (...) a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homony-mous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a evaluating proposition about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We thus explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version. (shrink)

Abstract Pavel Florensky solves Lewis Carroll’s ‘Barbershop’ paradox to support his reasoning in a previous chapter. Our discussion includes a) the problem (which we also refer to as the p paradox), b) Carroll’s solution, c) Bertrand Russell’s solution, d) Florensky’s solution and then e) a material example proffered by Florensky. Both Russell and Florensky disagree with Carroll’s solution, yet, (ostensibly) unbeknownst to themselves they offer the same solution, which is ‘p implies not-q’. Given Florensky’s material example, the solution seems (...) to tell us something about the logic of belief. We ask whether Florensky’s example has reverse implications for Russell’s solution. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-10 DOI 10.1007/s11406-011-9333-6 Authors Michael Rhodes, Philosophy and Religious Studies (NPD), Chicago, IL, USA Journal Philosophia Online ISSN 1574-9274 Print ISSN 0048-3893. (shrink)

The "hard problem" of today's consciousness studies is subjective experience: understanding why some brain processing is accompanied by an experienced inner life. Recent scientific advances offer insights for understanding the physiological and chemical phenomenology of consciousness. But by leaving aside the internal experiential nature of consciousness in favor of mapping neural activity, such science leaves many questions unanswered. In Ontology of Consciousness, scholars from a range of disciplines -- from neurophysiology to parapsychology, from mathematics to anthropology and indigenous non-Western modes (...) of thought -- go beyond these limits of current neuroscience research to explore insights offered by other intellectual approaches to consciousness. These scholars focus their attention on such philosophical approaches to consciousness as Tibetan Tantric Buddhism, North American Indian insights, pre-Columbian Mesoamerican civilization, and the Byzantine Empire. Some draw on artifacts and ethnographic data to make their point. Others translate cultural concepts of consciousness into modern scientific language using models and mathematical mappings. Many consider individual experiences of sentience and existence, as seen in African communalism, Hindi psychology, Zen Buddhism, Indian vibhuti phenomena, existentialism, philosophical realism, and modern psychiatry. Some reveal current views and conundrums in neurobiology to comprehend sentient intellection. Contributors: Karim Akerma, Matthijs Cornelissen, Antoine Courban, Mario Crocco, Christian de Quincey, Thomas B. Fowler, Erlendur Haraldsson, David. J. Hufford, Pavel B. Ivanov, Heinz Kimmerle, Stanley Krippner, Armand J. Labbé, James Maffie, Hubert Markl, Graham Parkes, Michael Polemis, E Richard Sorenson, Mircea Steriade, Thomas Szasz, Mariela Szirko, Robert A.F. Thurman, Edith L.B. Turner, Julia Watkin, Helmut Wautischer. (shrink)

The subject of the present inquiry is the approach-to-the-truth research, which started with the publication of Sir Karl Popper's Conjectures and Refutations. In the decade before this publication, Popper fiercely attacked the ideas of Rudolf Carnap about confirmation and induction; and ten years later, in the famous tenth chapter of Conjectures he introduced his own ideas about scientific progress and verisimilitude. Abhorring inductivism for its apprecia tion of logical weakness rather than strength, Popper tried to show that fallibilism could serve (...) the purpose of approach to the truth. To substantiate this idea he formalized the common sense intuition about preferences, that is: B is to be preferred to A if B has more advantages andfewer drawbacks than A. In 1974, however, David Millerand Pavel Tichy proved that Popper's formal explication could not be used to compare false theories. Subsequently, many researchers proposed alternatives or tried to improve Popper's original definition. (shrink)

This book takes a bold new look at ways of exploring the nature, origins, and potentials of consciousness within the context of science and religion.

This paper evaluates the current use of the Principal Agent Model (PAM) in accounting and finance, focusing on the agent'ss use of private information. The agent'ss behavioral norms in the the PAM deviate from commonly held ethical values in society, from models of man in conventional economic theory, and also from behavioral foundations of related business school fields like corporate strategy, business ethics, and human resource management. Still, it would be unwise to reject the PAM solely because of its distasteful (...) ethical assumptions. The model does appear to have predictive power, but its descriptive or normative qualities remain unexplored. The popularity of the PAM, with its extreme model of man, raises fundamental questions about the impact of this model on business school stakeholders and society at large. (shrink)

Edited book containing the following essays: 1 Getting over Gettier, Alan Musgrave.- 2 Justified Believing: Avoiding the Paradox Gregory W. Dawes.- 3 Literature and Truthfulness,Gregory Currie.- 4 Where the Buck-passing Stops, Andrew Moore.- 5 Universal Darwinism: Its Scope and Limits, James Maclaurin, - 6 The Future of Utilitarianism,Tim Mulgan. 7 Kant on Experiment, Alberto Vanzo.- 8 Did Newton ʻFeignʼ the Corpuscular Hypothesis? Kirsten Walsh.- 9 The Progress of Scotland: The Edinburgh Philosophical Societies and the Experimental Method, Juan Gomez.- 10 Propositions: (...) Truth vs. Existence, Heather Dyke.- 11 Against Advanced Modalizing, Josh Parsons.- 12 Spread Worlds, Plenitude and Modal Realism: A Problem for DavidLewis, Charles R. Pigden and Rebecca E. B. Entwisle.- 13 Defending Quine on Ontological Commitment. 14. The Scandal of Platonism, Vladimír Svoboda.- 15 A Neglected Reply to Prior's Dilemma J. C. Beall. 16 Mathematical and Empirical Concepts, Pavel Materna.- 17 Post-Fregean Thoughts on Propositional Unity, Bjørn Jespersen.- 18 Best-path Theorem Proving: Compiling Derivations, Martin Frické.- 19 Is Imperative Inference Impossible?, Hannah Clark-Younger. ​. (shrink)

This study examines the history of the psychoanalytic theory of mysticism, starting with the seminal correspondence between Freud and Romain Rolland concerning the concept of "oceanic feeling." Providing a corrective to current views which frame psychoanalysis as pathologizing mysticism, Parsons reveals the existence of three models entertained by Freud and Rolland: the classical reductive, ego-adaptive, and transformational. Then, reconstructing Rolland's personal mysticism through texts and letters unavailable to Freud, Parsons argues that Freud misinterpreted the oceanic feeling. In offering a fresh (...) interpretation of Rolland's mysticism, Parsons constructs a new dialogical approach for psychoanalytic theory of mysticism which integrates culture studies, developmental perspectives, and the deep epistemological and transcendent claims of the mystics. (shrink)

The argument rests on earlier work questioning the Russellian separation of levels and arguing that Russellian levels should be taken to include the levels of particle and aggregate, and generality and detail. That earlier work argues from the non-separation of particle and aggregate that predictability is limited and that physics cannot come to an end. This leads to a view of the world as flux. Identifiable objects demanding explanation can only be temporary entities emerging from flux and explanation can only (...) be local and historical. This precludes explanation of totality and leads us to reject Leibniz’s question. Baldwin’s argument from possible worlds theory that a null world is possible is examined and questioned. Koon’s combination of the kalam argument with the grim reaper paradox is not queried but a way is found of circumventing it. It is noted in passing that the argument does not have the anti-theistic implications which may appear. (shrink)

In list-method directed forgetting, reexposure to forgotten List 1 items has been shown to reduce directed forgetting. proposed that reexposure to a few List 1 items only during a direct test of memory reinstates the entire List 1 episode. In the present experiments, part-list reexposure in the context of indirect as well as direct memory tests reduced directed forgetting. Directed forgetting was reduced when 50% or more of the items were reexposed, and was intact when only 25% were reexposed. Furthermore, (...) part-list reexposure appeared to reinstate only reexposed items-not the entire List 1 episode. (shrink)